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Walls or Welcome Mats? Immigration and the Public Treasury
Summary
Advocates of restrictive immigration policies often claim that immigrants impose a net burden on the public
treasury. The most comprehensive and authoritative study of the fiscal effects of immigration in the U.S. finds,
however, that there is a net positive effect. If policymakers are concerned that less skilled immigrants may pose
some risk of a fiscal burden, then restricting immigrant access to means-tested public benefits would be a
better response than denying them admission. A path to citizenship for these immigrants need not entail a
fiscal burden as long as their access to these public benefits and citizenship is sufficiently delayed.
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Walls or Welcome Mats? 
Immigration and the Public 
Treasury (Part two of a two-part series)
Howard F. Chang
As the presidential campaigns in the United States approach the Democratic and 
Republican National Conventions this summer, immigration policy remains a 
deeply divisive issue.
The Republican candidate Donald Trump promises 
to build a border wall between the United States 
and Mexico, which he claims Mexico will fund.1 
He has also vowed to deport all 11 million unau-
thorized immigrants in the United States.2 Results 
from a March 2016 survey from the Public Religion 
Research Institute, however, suggest that while this 
campaign rhetoric may appeal to older Republicans, 
it may have limited appeal for other Americans.3 A 
62-percent majority of Americans, and 63 percent of 
Republicans between the ages of 18 and 29, support a 
path to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants cur-
rently living here. Only 19 percent of Americans want 
unauthorized immigrants deported. Half of all Ameri-
cans, and a slim majority (51 percent) of Republicans 
between the ages of 18 and 29, believe that immigra-
tion strengthens American society, as opposed to 34 
percent of Americans and 36 percent of these young 
Republicans who view immigration as a threat to 
American customs and values. Thus, polling indicates 
that restrictive immigration proposals do not align 
with the preferences of most Americans, including  
the young voters who represent the future of the 
Republican Party.
SUMMARY
• Advocates of restrictive immigration policies often claim that 
immigrants impose a net burden on the public treasury. The 
most comprehensive and authoritative study of the fiscal ef-
fects of immigration in the U.S. finds, however, that there is a 
net positive effect.
• Congress could increase the economic welfare of U.S. natives 
by liberalizing our immigration restrictions. The U.S. Senate took 
a step in this direction in June 2013 by passing a bipartisan 
comprehensive immigration reform bill (S. 744), but the House 
has failed to act on it.
• If some in Congress are concerned that less skilled immigrants 
may pose some risk of a fiscal burden, then restricting immi-
grant access to means-tested public benefits would be a better 
response than denying them admission. A path to citizenship 
for these immigrants need not entail a fiscal burden as long 
as their access to these public benefits and citizenship is suf-
ficiently delayed.
• An expanded guest worker program could include a path to 
citizenship through a merit-based point system like that proposed 
in S. 744 for alien workers on W visas. Congress could grant 
legalized immigrants a path to citizenship through the same 
system. If this system gave these immigrants a realistic chance 
of eventually obtaining green cards, then such a compromise 
might allow comprehensive immigration reform to emerge from 
Congress.
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As discussed in Part I of this 
series, Immigration and the Labor Mar-
ket (http://bit.ly/IssueBriefV4N4), 
economists generally agree that 
restrictive immigration proposals 
would harm the U.S. economy and 
deprive natives of the economic ben-
efits of immigrant labor. In this issue 
brief, Part II, I will turn to the impact 
of immigration on the public sector.4 
Here immigrants confer economic 
benefits on U.S. natives by expanding 
the tax base and paying taxes, but they 
also impose costs when they receive 
transfers from the public treasury or 
otherwise increase the costs of public 
programs. This observation raises 
the question asked by the economist 
George Borjas: “Do immigrants pay 
their way in the welfare state?”5
THE FISCAL IMPACT OF 
IMMIGRATION
Advocates of restrictive immigration 
policies often claim that immigrants 
impose a net burden on the public 
treasury, pointing to studies that add 
up the fiscal costs and fiscal benefits 
currently generated by immigrant-
headed households at one particular 
point in time. These crude calcula-
tions include the costs imposed by 
the chil dren of immigrants on public 
schools, while excluding the ben-
efits that children who are born U.S. 
citizens will generate when they grow 
up, start their own households, work, 
and pay taxes. A proper accounting of 
the total fiscal impact of immigration 
would avoid this bias by including not 
only the fiscal impact of each immi-
grant over the entire life cycle of that 
immigrant but also the fiscal impact 
expected from all the descendants of 
that immigrant. After all, but for the 
admission of the immigrant, none of 
those descendants would be present.
In 1997, the National Research 
Council (NRC) conducted the first 
study to attempt this comprehensive 
calculation of the fiscal impact of 
immigration, including projections 
regarding the education, income, and 
fiscal effects of future generations.6 
Thus, this study represents a quantum 
leap in sophistication beyond any prior 
study of the fiscal impact of immi-
grants. The NRC study remains the 
most careful, thorough, and complete 
analysis of the fiscal effects of immi-
gration in the United States.
The NRC finds that the expected 
net effect of the descendants of 
immigrants on the public treasury is 
positive. These future generations tend 
to be better educated, have higher 
incomes, and pay more taxes than their 
immigrant forebears. Taking the future 
fiscal impact of these generations into 
account, under the most plausible set 
of assumptions, the NRC finds that 
the average recent immigrant in 1996 
has a positive fiscal impact of $80,000 
in net present value. In fact, an 
updated analysis based on more recent 
data yields an even larger net benefit, 
estimating that the average immigrant 
in 1998 has a positive fiscal impact of 
$99,000 in net present value.7 
The NRC study also found that 
immigrants with more education 
tended to earn more income, pay more 
in taxes, and be less likely to qualify 
for means-tested public benefits than 
those with less education. Thus, the 
expected fiscal impact of any immi-
grant depends in part on that immi-
grant’s level of education: The average 
immigrant with more than a high-
school education has a positive fiscal 
impact of $198,000 in net present 
value; the average immigrant with only 
a high-school education has a positive 
fiscal impact of $51,000 in net pres-
ent value; and the average immigrant 
with less than a high-school education 
has a modest negative fiscal impact of 
-$13,000 in net present value. 
Another characteristic that affects 
an immigrant’s fiscal impact is age 
at the time of entry. The younger 
 1  Trump Campaign, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/
immigration-reform.
 2  Cable News Network, http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/11/
politics/donald-trump-deportation-force-debate-immigra-
tion/.
 3  Public Religion Research Institute, http://publicreligion.
org/newsroom/2016/03/news-release-republicans-face-
generational-divide-on-immigration-majority-of-young-
republicans-believe-immigrants-strengthen-u-s-support-
path-to-citizenship/#.VwGBYMc04_U.
 4  This brief draws upon my discussion in Howard F. Chang 
(ed.), Law and Economics of Immigration, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2015.  I am grateful for the assistance of 
Matthew Stengel in the preparation of this brief.
 5  George J. Borjas (1994), “The Economics of Immigration”, 
Journal of Economic Literature, XXXII (4), 1667-1717.
 6  Panel on the Demographic and Economic Impacts of Im-
migration, National Research Council (1997), “The Future 
Fiscal Impacts of Current Immigrants”, in James P. Smith 
and Barry Edmonston (eds), The New Americans: Economic, 
Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration, Chapter 7, 
Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 297-362.
 7  Ronald Lee and Timothy Miller (2000), “Immigration, Social 
Security, and Broader Fiscal Impacts,” American Economic 
Review 90 (2), 350-54.
 8  Howard F. Chang (1997), “Liberalized Immigration as Free 
Trade: Economic Welfare and the Optimal Immigration 
Policy”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 145 (5), 
1147-1244; Howard F. Chang (1998), “Migration as Inter-
national Trade: The Economic Gains from the Liberalized 
NOTES
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the immigrant, the more years that 
immigrant can spend working in the 
United States, and the more taxes 
that immigrant can pay prior to 
retirement. Thus, the NRC finds that 
even an immigrant with less than a 
high-school education has a positive 
expected fiscal impact if that immi-
grant enters the United States by the 
age of 21. Thus, the fiscal impact of 
immigration proves to be positive in 
part because immigrants tend to arrive 
as young workers.
Immigrants to the United States 
often arrive as young adults who will 
not participate in entitlement pro-
grams for the elderly for many years. 
Young workers have the most to gain 
by immigration because they can 
enjoy higher wages in the U.S. labor 
market over a longer period of time. 
As you can see from the age distri-
bution of immigrants compared to 
natives in Figure 1, immigrants are 
disproportionately of working age.
Finally, the NRC study also 
reveals how the fiscal impact of 
immigrants is a function of the poli-
cies applied to them. In particular, the 
NRC studies the effect of restric-
tions on immigrant access to public 
benefits. The NRC finds that the 
Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996 improved the fiscal impact of 
the average immigrant in the United 
States by $8,000 in net present value 
by excluding immigrants from federal 
means-tested entitlement programs 
for five years after entry. This change 
in the law thereby increased the net 
positive impact of the average immi-
grant from $80,000 to $88,000 in net 
present value. The NRC found that 
this legislation had a positive expected 
fiscal effect for immigrants with all 
levels of education, regardless of the 
immigrant’s age at arrival.
IMPLICATIONS FOR 
IMMIGRATION REFORM 
For the sake of argument, let’s assume 
that the goal of our immigration 
policy is to promote the economic 
interests of U.S. natives. After all, the 
interests of natives seems most rel-
evant as a practical matter for govern-
ments of countries receiving immi-
grants and is also commonly thought 
to support restrictive immigration 
laws. Given the economic theory and 
the empirical evidence that I have 
reviewed, however, this objective 
Movement of Labor”, UCLA Journal of International Law and 
Foreign Affairs 3 (2), Fall/Winter, 371-414.
 9  See S. 744, 113th Congress (2013).
 10  Sherrie A. Kossoudji and Deborah A. Cobb-Clark (2002): 
Coming out of the Shadows: Learning about Legal Status 
and Wages from the Legalized Population”, Journal of Labor 
Economics, 20 (3), 598-628.
 11  Congressional Budget Office (2013), The Economic Impact 
of S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and 
Immigration Modernization Act.
 12  Alan O. Sykes (1995), “The Welfare Economics of Immi-
gration Law: A Theoretical Survey with an Analysis of U.S. 
Policy,” in Warren F. Schwartz (ed.), Justice in Immigration, 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 158-200.
 13  8 U.S.C. sec. 1427(a).
 14  8 U.S.C. sec. 1611(a).
 15  Howard F. Chang (2008), “Guest Workers and Justice in a 
Second-Best World”, University of Dayton Law Review, 34 
(1), 3-14.
 16  Howard F. Chang (2002), “Liberal Ideals and Political Fea-
sibility: Guest-Worker Programs as Second-Best Policies”, 
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial 
Regulation, 27 (3), 465-81.
NOTES 
FIGURE 1: AGE DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. IMMIGRANTS AND NATIVES, 2014
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, 2014
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would call for more liberal admissions 
policies instead.8 
If we consider our immigration 
laws from the perspective of econom-
ics, then the primary problem with 
our current admissions policies is 
that they are they are unduly restric-
tive. The United States has made it 
too difficult for valuable workers and 
taxpayers to enter the United States. 
Quotas severely limit the supply of 
visas well below the demand for these 
visas, creating costly backlogs that 
cause immigrants to wait many years 
for their visas. As the NRC found, the 
older an immigrant is at the time of 
entry, the less the immigrant will pay 
in taxes over the immigrant’s remain-
ing years in the United States, and the 
less favorable the fiscal impact of that 
immigrant. So longer backlogs make 
not only immigrants but also natives 
worse off: Long waiting periods mean 
that immigrants enter later in life, 
limiting the years during which they 
can contribute to our economic wel-
fare by providing labor as workers and 
by paying taxes to the public treasury.
When the NRC studied the 
economic and fiscal effects of immi-
gration, the NRC economists con-
cluded that immigration produces net 
benefits for natives, both in the labor 
market and through the public sector. 
As I discussed in Part I of this series, 
economists estimate that immigrant 
workers add billions of dollars per year 
to the real income of natives in the 
United States by supplying their labor 
to our labor market. Furthermore, 
immigration also makes us better 
off by increasing tax revenues in the 
United States. These findings sug-
gest that higher levels of immigration 
would produce even bigger benefits 
for the U.S. economy. So why not 
liberalize our restrictive quotas? 
In June 2013, the U.S. Senate took 
a promising step in this direction by 
passing a comprehensive immigration 
reform bill, S. 744, with bipartisan 
support. The U.S. House of Represen-
tatives, however, has failed to act on 
that bill. This bill, also known as the 
Border Security, Economic Opportu-
nity, and Immigration Modernization 
Act,9 would not only legalize many 
unauthorized immigrants already in 
the United States but also would take 
several important steps to address the 
problem of backlogs in our current 
system for legal immigration. For 
example, the bill would provide suf-
ficient visas to clear current backlogs 
within 7 years. 
Unauthorized immigrants given 
legal status by the bill would not get 
green cards until those backlogs were 
eliminated. Legalized immigrants 
generally would have to spend 10 
years in provisional status and would 
go to the back of the line for green 
cards, behind those waiting patiently 
for their legal immigration visas. 
Economists Sherrie Kossoudji and 
Deborah Cobb-Clark studied the 
wage impacts of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) 
of 1986 and found that the legal-
ization of previously unauthorized 
immigrants through IRCA led to an 
increase of 6 percent in their wages.10 
Citing this research, the Congres-
sional Budget Office predicted that 
the Senate bill would increase tax 
revenues from these workers and other 
immigrants, thereby reducing federal 
budget deficits.11
The Senate bill would also treat 
spouses and children of lawful per-
manent resident aliens as “immediate 
relatives,” which would exempt them 
from quotas entirely. Spouses and 
minor children of U.S. citizens can 
already enter as “immediate relatives” 
without any ceilings. The Senate bill 
would extend this treatment to the 
spouses and minor children of legal 
permanent residents. This solution 
would give priority to nuclear families 
and avoid backlogs for these relatives 
without taking immigration visas from 
any other categories.
The bill also would elimi-
nate all quotas on the most skilled 
employment-based immigrants, 
including those with extraordinary 
ability, outstanding professors and 
researchers, multinational executives 
and managers, those with doctorate 
degrees, physicians, and workers who 
recently received advanced degrees 
in science, technology, engineering, 
or mathematics (STEM) fields from 
universities in the United States. 
These STEM immigrants also would 
be exempt from labor certifica-
tion requirements. Furthermore, the 
spouses and children of employment-
based immigrants would not count 
toward quotas, which would allow 
more of these immigrants to enter. 
These preference categories already 
reserve most employer-sponsored 
immigration visas for skilled work-
ers with offers of employment, who 
are likely to contribute to the public 
treasury by paying income taxes and 
unlikely to rely on any means-tested 
entitlement programs.12 Thus, liberal-
izing these admissions is especially 
likely to promote the economic wel-
fare of natives. 
Our immigration laws also impose 
quotas that limit the number of 
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immigration visas available to any 
one country, and these quotas are 
completely insensitive to population 
and to the demand for these visas. 
The Senate bill would have eliminated 
ceilings based on the country of origin 
from all employment-based immi-
grant categories. These per country 
quotas have caused especially long 
waits for immigrants from China and 
India. The Senate bill would allocate 
these visas on a country-neutral basis 
instead. This reform would be even 
better if it also applied to family-
based visas, which should also be 
available without discrimination based 
on national origin. 
The Senate bill would also create a 
new nonimmigrant V visa for family-
sponsored immigrants to enter, live in, 
and work in the United States while 
waiting for approval of their immigra-
tion visas. Thus, in the future, backlogs 
would not prevent the reunification 
of families or delay the contributions 
that immigrants can make to our 
economy through the labor market or 
the public treasury.
Finally, the bill would create 
new nonimmigrant visa programs 
for less skilled workers: one program 
for agricultural visas and another for 
other workers. These W visas would 
allow workers to enter for a 3-year 
period and would be renewable. These 
visas would also allow workers within 
each category to leave one employer 
to work for another employer reg-
istered with the program, unlike 
past programs which tied each guest 
worker to a specific employer. Free-
dom to leave an employer and to take 
employment elsewhere would give 
workers greater power to assert their 
rights against employers and thereby 
prevent abuses, without destroying 
the economic gains that natives enjoy 
in the labor market from employing 
these workers. These visas would give 
less skilled workers a legal alternative 
to illegal entry and life as an unau-
thorized immigrant.
From the perspective of the 
economic interests of natives, these 
guest-worker programs may also be an 
effective response to concerns regard-
ing the impact of relatively unskilled 
alien workers on the public treasury. 
Through such programs, natives 
enjoy the benefits of these workers 
in the labor market but do not bear 
the fiscal burden of providing the 
full set of public benefits that these 
workers would receive if they had 
ready access to permanent residence 
and, ultimately, citizenship. Although 
immigrants can gain full access to 
public benefits upon naturalization, 
only aliens “admitted for permanent 
residents” may naturalize as U.S. 
citizens.13 Alien workers admitted 
on nonimmigrant visas only are not 
admitted as permanent residents and 
are thus not eligible for most public 
entitlements and are not eligible  
to naturalize.
Our laws generally exclude not 
only unauthorized immigrants but 
also nonimmigrants, including tem-
porary workers, from a broad range 
of public benefits. With only narrow 
exceptions, these aliens are ineligible 
for “any Federal public benefit.”14 
Because guest-worker programs can 
give relatively unskilled aliens access 
to our labor markets without necessar-
ily providing full access to the benefits 
provided to citizens, these programs 
may allow the most liberal admis-
sions policies possible for these aliens 
without imposing a fiscal burden on 
natives. I have suggested that such 
a program could even accommodate 
the desire of some guest workers to 
remain by allowing guest workers to 
renew their visas for an indefinite 
number of multiple periods.15 As 
long as the U.S. restricts their access 
to public benefits, they seem unlikely 
to impose a net fiscal burden on the 
public treasury.
THE PATH TO CITIZENSHIP
From the perspective of the interests 
of the guest workers, or from the 
perspective of principles of justice 
in a democracy, the ideal immigra-
tion policy would provide the option 
of lawful permanent residence and 
access to citizenship. To better reflect 
democratic ideals, we could offer a 
path to citizenship for guest workers 
who compile a record of employment 
and avoid criminal activity.16 In fact, 
under the Senate bill, workers on 
W visas could apply for permanent 
residence through a merit-based point 
system, which would award two points 
for each year spent working lawfully 
in the United States up to a limit of 
20 points. Thus, admission as a guest 
worker need not entail permanent 
status as an alien.
Would a path to citizenship for 
less skilled immigrants raise the 
prospect of a fiscal burden? Not 
necessarily: by requiring guest work-
ers to spend years in nonimmigrant 
status first, we delay their access to 
the full set of public benefits that we 
provide to citizens. This delay itself 
would improve the fiscal impact of 
each immigrant. The longer the delay, 
the greater the improvement in the 
6publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
immigrant’s fiscal impact. The empiri-
cal evidence presented by the NRC 
suggests that we could allow even 
less skilled immigrants to naturalize 
without imposing a net fiscal burden 
if a sufficient period with limited 
access to public benefits has passed. 
These observations would apply not 
only to guest workers on W visas but 
also to family-sponsored immigrants 
on V visas or to legalized immigrants 
with provisional status. The Senate bill 
would allow all of these aliens to work 
and pay taxes in the United States 
without access to specified public 
benefits while seeking permanent 
resident status.
In reality, access to citizenship 
is a matter of degree. Guest workers 
might have the opportunity to adjust 
status only after a short period of resi-
dence or only after a long period.  
We might demand a long work his-
tory or impose less stringent require-
ments. We could choose any point 
along this continuum to satisfy critics 
concerned about the fiscal impact of 
less skilled immigrants. By adjusting 
the points a guest worker could earn 
through years of work in the United 
States and by adjusting the total num-
ber of immigrant visas issued through 
this point system, we can adjust the 
guest worker’s prospects for perma-
nent residence and the number of 
years that a guest worker could expect 
to wait to adjust status.
In fact, the flexibility of such a 
points system is a virtue that might 
also facilitate a political compromise 
on a path to citizenship for unauthor-
ized immigrants granted legal status. 
At least some Republicans in the 
House of Representatives expressed 
a willingness to grant legal status to 
unauthorized immigrants but objected 
to the “special” path to citizenship 
provided by the Senate bill. A possible 
compromise would allow legalized 
immigrants to apply for green cards 
through the same immigration system 
that is open to all prospective immi-
grants. If Congress were to liberalize 
that immigration system enough, so 
that enough legalized immigrants 
could have a realistic chance of even-
tually obtaining green cards, then we 
could have the makings of a compro-
mise that might finally allow compre-
hensive immigration reform to emerge 
from Congress. 
CONCLUSION
The most comprehensive and authori-
tative study of the fiscal effects of 
immigration in the United States 
finds that immigrants have a net posi-
tive effect on the public treasury. These 
results, together with the benefits that 
immigrant workers confer on natives 
in the labor market, suggest that the 
economic interests of natives would 
be served by more liberal admissions 
policies. In particular, the United 
States should eliminate or liberalize 
the quotas imposed on immigration. 
To the extent that the least educated 
immigrants may pose some risk of a 
fiscal burden, the best response would 
be to restrict access to means-tested 
public benefits rather than to deny 
such immigrants admission. Exclud-
ing these immigrants or delaying their 
entry needlessly sacrifices the gains 
that both natives and immigrants 
would enjoy from immigrant partici-
pation in the labor market. The com-
prehensive immigration reform bill 
passed by the Senate in 2013 would 
have addressed this issue through new 
guest worker programs and increases 
in legal immigration. Unfortunately, 
that effort has stalled in Congress,  
and our dysfunctional immigration 
system remains badly in need of liber-
alizing reforms.
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